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EARL H. DE LONG* AND BRENDAN Q. O'BmiNt
The general problems and implications of property tax delinquency and the more
usual methods of property tax enforcement have been treated sufficiently in other
sections of this symposium to make further summary or comment at this point un-
necessary. The discussion, therefore, may move directly to the consideration of an
experiment of interest and importance in the field of delinquent tax collection. The
experiment is the tax receivership, an extraordinary device which has been invoked
from time to time recently to meet the utter breakdown of the more usual methods
of tax enforcement.
Unlike the more common provisions for tax collection, the tax receivership is
directed at the income from property.' It permits some public officer to take over
the property taxed, to manage it, and to collect and apply its income to the tax,
penalties, interest, costs, and costs of the receivership until the obligation is satisfied.
There is no indication how or when it arose, but it must have been suggested by the
analogy of receivership proceedings in mortgage foreclosures, and by the fact that
the statutes of most jurisdictions make a real property tax a lien against the property
taxed. These analogies become more apparent when we recognize that a statutory
tax sale is commonly spoken of as a tax foreclosure, although in many jurisdictions,
as in Illinois, there is a wide difference between the ordinary tax sale by a court of
law and the foreclosure of the tax lien in equity. Such similarities make it appro-
priate, therefor, to consider as the first question: Can a tax receivership be instituted
in, the absence of specific statutory authority? After that the discussion should con-
sider the provisions of the receivership statutes which have been adopted in a few
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states and the administrative and legal experience involved in the application of those
statutes.
TAX RECEI.VESHIPS IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTE
It can be assumed with confidence that no tax receiver can be appointed by a
court of law in the absence of specific statutory authority in the usual procedure for
the sale of delinquent property. It is generally stated by the courts that proceedings
for the enforcement of property taxes are statutory, that the statute must be followed
accurately, and that it shall be construed strictly in favor of the property owner.2
In establishing this statutory procedure, the legislature may confer jurisdiction
upon either a court of law or a court of equity unless there is some specific constitu-
tional limitation. Illinois, for example, confers jurisdiction upon courts of law in
the ordinary tax sale proceedings, but for fifty-five years Illinois has also provided by
statute for the foreclosure of the tax lien in equity 3
The rule that tax collection proceedings are exclusively statutory and require strict
construction of the statutes is ordinarily assumed by the courts to apply to proceed-
ings in equity as well as at law.4 Nevertheless, in spite of judicial pronouncements
to this effect, there is a possibility that courts of equity have some power to enforce
tax liens in the absence of statutes conferring such power upon them. In any event,
if a tax receiver is to be appointed without a specific provision for such a receivership,
it is clear that it must be done under the inherent power'of a court of equity, either
in a foreclosure proceeding in which no part of the jurisdiction rests on statute or in
a foreclosure proceeding based on a statute which fails to provide for such a receiver-
ship.
The language used by the courts to the effect that a court of equity has no juris-
diction to enforce a tax lien unless such jurisdiction is specifically conferred upon it
seems to rest primarily upon two propositions:
(I) The assessment and collection of taxes are legislative affairs and no function
of a court of equity.
(2) All proceedings for the collection and enforcement of taxes are statutory.
Thompson v. Allen County5 is the case often cited in support of the first of these
statements, and examination of the opinion and the cases cited there8 shows clearly
'State ex rel. Tillman v. Dist. Ct., 53 P. (2d) 107 (Mont. 1936); People v. Illinois Women's Athletic
Club, 360 Ill. 577, 196 N. E. 88x (i935); People v. Straus, 266 Ill. App. 95 (1932); Kansas City v. Field,
285 Mo. 253, 226 S. W. 27 (1920); Charland v. Trustees, 204 Mass. 563, 91 N. E. 146 (191o); Watts
v. Hauk, 144 Tenn. 215, 231 S. W. 903 (1920); Board of Freeholders v. Inhabitants of Weymouth, 68
N. J. L. 652, 54 At. 458 (i9o3); McNally v. Field, 119 Fed. 445 (D. R. I. x9o2); Thompson v. Allen
County, i15 U. S. 550 (1885); People v. Biggins, 96 Ill. 481 (188o).
'ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 12o, §238.
'People v. Illinois Women's Athletic Club, People v. Straus, Kansas City. v. Field, People v. Biggins,
all supra note 2. 5115 U. S. 550 (z885).
'Walkley v. City of Muscatine, 6 Wall. (73 U. S.) 481 (1868); Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. (86
U. S.) 107 (1874); Heine v. Levee Commissioners, 19 Wall. (86 U. S.) 655 (1874); Barkley v. Levee
Commissioners, 93 U. S. 258 (1876); Merriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472 (i88o); Supervisors v.
Rogers, 7 Wall. (74 U. S.) 175 (1869); McLean County Precinct v. Deposit Bank, 81 Ky. 254 (1883).
See also Yost v. Dallas County, 236 U. S.'5 o (i915).
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that the situations involved in no way resemble a foreclosure of a tax lien such as that
contemplated in this discussion. Those cases sought a remedy in equity when
mandamus or other remedies at law had failed to protect the interests of security
holders, and the aid of equity was asked to levy the taxes required to meet the bonds
or to enforce a general collection of taxes over a whole community where the local
administrative authorities had collapsed. This -is a far greater demand on equity
than a bill to foreclose a tax lien on a single piece of property, and a denial of equity
relief in these cases does not justify an assumption that the foreclosure of a tax lien
is a proceeding foreign to equity.7
As to the second point, we have found no cases in which equity's jurisdiction was
denied and in which there was not some kind of statutory remedy. Kansas City v.
Field presents a full discussion of this problem, and the language in which it states
its conclusions on this point is of interest: s "The courts are practically unanimous in
holding that if a statutory method of collection is provided, especially if it is adequate
and complete, equity is without jurisdiction." Following People v. Biggins,9 the
opinion states that in the presence of an adequate statutory remedy for the enforce-
ment of a tax lien, equity has no jurisdiction unless it is specifically conferred by
statute. The court adds, however, that "perhaps" the following limitation applies: 10
"If a statute gives a lien for taxes and provides no particular mode to enforce the
lien, equity will provide a remedy." It seems probable that these cases in which
equity's inherent power to foreclose tax liens has been denied can be rested on the
ground that the statutory remedy was adequate."- It is important to note that there
are a few cases which indicate that inadequacy, as distinguished from absence, of a
statutory remedy might be ground for foreclosure of the tax lien in equity although
no statute confers such jurisdiction on the court of equity.12
'On this point the texts on the subject of receivers usually cite the Thompson case, rupra note 5, and
assume uncritically that it covers the whole problem. An exception is Tardy's Smith on Receivers (2 ed.,
S92o), sec. 689 (vol. 2, p. 1878), which cites the Thompson case to the effect that a court of equity will
not appoint a tax receiver and continues as follows: "This statement, however, applies rather to the proposi-
tion of appointing a receiver as a substitute for the ordinary tax collecting officers to collect taxes in the
ordinary way. However, when taxes are to be collected by suit in equity from some particular person
whose property is subject to a lien for their payment, circumstances may be sufficient to warrant the
appointment of a receiver. As in any other kind of a case, there must be some ground for the appoint-
ment beyond the mere claim, or cause of action, for the taxes; something in the nature of danger of loss,
or removal, or injury to the property."
a285 Mo. 253, 271, 226 S. W. 27, 32 (1920) (italics ours).
'Supra note 2.
1 285 Mo. 253, 271, 226 S. W. 27, 32 (1920).
'Kansas City v. Field, supra note io, cites the following cases on this point: Corbin v. Young, 24
Kan. 145 (s88o); Louisville Trust Co. v. Muhlenberg County, 15 Ky. L. 397, 23 S. W. 674 (1893);
Greene County v. Murphy, 107 N. C. 36, 12 S. E. 122 (x8go); McHenry v. Kidder County, 8 N. D. 413,
79 N. W. 875 (1899); Pierce County v. Merrill, i9 Wash. 175, 52 Pac. 854 (1898); Board of Education
v. Old Dominion Co., x8 W. Va. 441 (x88x). See also Mosher v. Conway, 46 P. (2d) xio (Ariz. 1935);
Lemhi County v. Loan Co., 47 Idaho 712, 278 Pac. 214 (1929); Spellman Land and Secu'ities Co. v.
Standard Investment Co., 293 Mo. 120, 238 S. W. 48 (1922); Rochester v. Bloss, x85 N. Y. 42, 77 N. E.
794, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 694 (19o6).
"People v. Sears, 23o I11. App. 484 (923); Bates v. Realty Co., 306 Mo. 312, 267 S. W. 641 (1924);
People v. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry. Co., 169 Mich. 72, 135 N. W. 87 (1912); Marye v. Diggs, 98 Va.
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In spite of the general language which has been used in the opinions, the list of
precedents is not sufficiently impressive to justify the conclusion that equity has no
inherent jurisdiction whatever in tax enforcement. If the statute makes the tax a
lien against the property and if a court of equity can be convinced that the existing
statutory remedy is inadequate, it is likely to take jurisdiction of a proceeding to
foreclose the lien. The variable in the situation is, of course, the term inadequacy.'3
The more important question to this discussion is this: If equity has jurisdiction
of such a foreclosure, whether by statute or not, does it have power to appoint a
receiver to manage the property and apply the income to delinquent taxes if there
is no statutory provision for such a receiver?
In 19o2, in an equity foreclosure of a tax lien under the Illinois statutes, which did
not at that time provide for a tax receiver, the Circuit Court of Cook County ap-
pointed a receiver pendente lite, but in the Appellate Court the decree was reversed
on the ground that the land was a sufficient security for the indebtedness and that
under such circumstances, at least, the court had no power to appoint a receiver.14
In October, i93I, in People v. Straus'5 a receiver pendente lite was appointed in a
similar foreclosure proceeding in the Superior Court of Cook County, but this decree
was reversed by the Appellate Court, which reached the conclusion that specific
statutory authority was necessary and lacking. Although the case was apparently
disposed of on the ground that tax collection proceedings, whether in equity or not,
are strictly statutory, the court left a door very slightly open for the appointment of
a receiver if the property is not sufficient security for the taxes due. In People v.
Illinois Women's Athletic Club'6 a decree which, among other things, appointed a
tax receiver in a suit in equity was reversed on the ground that the Illinois tax
receivership statute was not in force at the time the appointment was made, but the
problem was not given any reasoned consideration. Also, this was not a foreclosure
proceeding.
749, 37 S. E. 315 (igoo); Grant v. Bartholomew, 57 Neb. 673, 78 N. W. 314 (1899); Greene County v.
Murphy, supra note xx; State v. Duncan, 3 Lea (7z Tenn.) 679 (1879); Edgefield v. Brien, 3 Tenn.
Ch. 673 (x878); Webb v. Miller, 8 Heisk. (55 Tenn.) 448 (1873); Mayor v. McKee, 2 Yerg. (io Tenn.)
z67 (x826); Mclnerney v. Reed, 23 Iowa 410 (1868).
'The Supreme Court of Illinois, in People v. Illinois Women's Athletic Club, supra note 2, passed
over a real opportunity to deal with this problem. It dismissed the whole issue of inadequacy of remedy
very summarily without any recognition of the importance of the question presented. The Cook Colnty
Board of Commissioners filed several hundred bills in equity to enforce the payment of taxes when the
ordinary machinery broke down completely in 1931 and 1932. The decree of the lower court fixed
the amount of the taxes due, ordered payment, and appointed a receiver to collect. On appeal the court
in a disappointing opinion ignored the fact that the remedies at law. were inadequate as a matter of
practical administration and reversed on the ground that courts of equity have no power to fix the
amount of taxes due. In specifically considering the appointment of the receiver the court stated that the
appointment was improper because such tax proceedings are statutory and no statute existed at the time
to authorize such an appointment. There is no reference in the opinion to any of the cases cited in note
12 which suggests that inadequacy of the remedy at law is ground for equity jurisdiction in tax lien
enforcement.
"Chicago Real Estate Loan and Trust Co. v. People, 104 Il. App. 290 (s9o2).
266 Ill. App. 95 (1932). This opinion is.a very important discussion of this problem.
'eSupra notes 2 and 13.
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In the case of State v. Collier, although the Tennessee statutes authorized the
appointment of a tax receiver, the court said:17
"A court of chancery would doubtless have had the right to make such an appointment
in a proper case regardless of the statutes, since the state is a lien holder."
This case is of interest, however, not so much because of this dictum as for its
interpretation of the statute under which the receiver was appointed.18 In reviewing
the appointment of a receiver under the statute, the court m'de this statement:"
"There is no allegation in the petition that the property is being misused, wasted, or
neglected so that the value of the security is being endangered. There is no allegation
that the land is not adequate security for the taxes due. None of the grounds that are
ordinarily set out-upon the application of a lien holder for a receiver appear in the peti-
tion."
The cases and comments which deny the power of equity to appoint a tax receiver
in the absence of statute clearly rest on the ground \that all tax proceedings are
statutory-a proposition upon which the.preceding discussion throws some doubt.
This, together with the usual assumption that equity has inherent power to appoint
a receiver in a case within its jurisdiction if such appointment is necessary,20 indicates
that it is entirely possible that a court of equity has inherent power to appoint a
tax receiver in a proceeding to foreclose a tax lien, whether or not the jurisdiction in
the foreclosure suit rests on statute. This seems reasonable even in face of the fact
that we have found no cases in which such an appointment has been permitted in
the absence of specific statutory authorization.
The statement from State v. Collier, the cQmments of the Illinois courts,21 and
the grounds required generally for the appointment of receivers22 indicate that any
17165 Tenn. 163, 166, 53 S. W. (ad) 982 (1932). See, for a comment on this case, Note (1933) 11
TasN. LAw REv. 132, which concludes that the court did ndt imply any inherent power in equity to
appoint a receiver but that it really rested this dictum on the fact that Tennessee statutes provide that
equity proceedings for collection of taxes shall conform to other chancery suits. Relying on Thompson v.
Allen County, supra note 5, it is suggested in the comment that equity has no inherent power to enforce
taxes. The analysis is not persuasive nor critical, however, and makes no reference whatever to the Tennes-
see cases, especially State v. Duncan, supra note s2, which indicate that Tennessee might go as far as any
state in permitting the exercise by courts of equity of inherent power in the enforcement of tax liens.
' "And in all cases, the courts in which such bills may be filed are authorized to appoint receivers to
take charge of the property which is the subject-matte.r of the litigation and collect the rents and profits
thereon, to the end that the net amount of such rents and profits after paying the receiver reasonable
compensation, shall be applied to the taxes, costs, penalties, and interest involved in such suits and incident
thereto." TzsN. CODE (Shannon, 1932) S6o2.
" 165 Tenn. 163, x66, 53 S. W. (2) 982, 983 (1932).
OSee especially, Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Mack, 347 111. 480, 180 N. E. 412 (1932). Also,
Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 229 Mich. 491, 201 N. W. 448 (1924); Cobe v. Guyer, 237 II.
516, 86 N. E. 1071 (19o9); CsAmx, REcxva (2 ed., 1929) 5283; Smrns, REbrIcVERs (Tardy, a ed. 1920)
5693.
3'Chcago Real Estate Loan and Trust Co. v. People, supra note x4; People v. Straus, supra note 15.
S"The appointment of a receiver being a remedy of such a harsh nature, the power of appointment is
exercised by the courts only in cases where failure to do so would place the petitioning party in danger
of suffering an irreparable loss or injury. This generally means that, in order to show cause for the
appointment of a receiver, the petitioner must show either a clear legal right in himself to the property
in controvessy,. that he has some lien upon it, or that it constitutes a special fund out of which he is
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inherent power of a court of equity to appoint a tax receiver could operate only in
cases much more serious than those against which the tax receivership legislation of
recent years has been invoked. It is probable that such a receiver could be appointed
only if the property is inadequate security for the lien or if it is being wasted, mis-
used, neglected, or destroyed. Even then, of course, the statutory remedy must be
inadequate.221 Even if equity does have such 'power, however, it may not mean
much. It seems probable that the grounds are so restricted that such an appointment
could accomplish little as a matter of practical tax administration, for in most of
the cases in which receivership proceedings have been initiated in Cook County it
would be very difficult to prove waste, misuse, neglect, or destruction to the degree
required in receivership proceedings in courts of equity. 3
It is well to consider, of course, that the powers of the courts are susceptible to
tremendous expansion in the interest of effective operation of government,24 and the
power of equity to appoint a tax receiver may be one point at which such expansion
might be accomplished. Even under the restricted grounds which usually govern
the appointment of receivers, the fact that property is producing income and the fact
that taxes are delinquent might alone be evidence of waste sufficient to justify the
appointment of a tax receiver if the statutes make the tax a lien against the rents and
income and not merely against the property alone.25
TAx RECEImVSHIP LEGisrAnON
Whatever may be the possibilities of the inherent powers of a court of equity
in the development of the tax receivership, the statutes are probably the basis of any
present or immediately potential use of the device. It is a matter of interest, therefor,
to undertake a brief comparison of the tax receivership legislation which has been
enacted recently.
The statutes of Tennessee and Minnesota, to which some reference has already
entitled to satisfaction of his demands, and it must appear that possession of the property was obtained
by defendant through fraud, or that the property or income from it is in danger of loss from the neglect,
waste, or misconduct of defendant, and applicant must have a present, existing interest in the property
over which he seeks to have the receiver appointed." SarT, op. cit. supra note 20, §. To the same'
effect: REEvES, ILLiNois LAw OF MORTGAGES AND Foancz.osutRas (1932) §536; HIGH, Rxcasvaas (4 th ed.,
1go) §§647, 643. But see Cashmore v. Hanna, 276 Ill. App. 339 (1934).
" It may be necessary also to prove insolvency. One remedy at law is the action of debt against the
property owner which might be regarded as adequate if the owner is solvent.
"Lack of space prevents any discussion of those statutes which provide for foreclosure of a tax lien
in the same manner as provided for foreclosure of mortgages. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. (1935) §75.19. The
procedure established for general mortgage foreclosures generally includes the power to appoint a receiver
for the property involved, and it is possible that the application of such procedure to tax foreclosures may
carry with it, therefore, the power to appoint a tax receiver. This possibility may be worthy of investigation
by tax officials who have not been armed with a specific tax receivership statute.
"People ex rel. McDonough v. Cesar, 349 Ill. 372, x82 N. E. 448 (1932), is a conspicuous example
of a decision in which the Illinois Supreme Court stretched the revenue provisions of the state constitution
to the breaking point in an effort to expedite the collection of taxes.
For a discussion, of the question of waste with respect to taxable property see State cx rel. Tillman
v. District Court, 53 P. (2d) 107 (Mont. 1936).
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been made, can be dismissed quite summarily.28 The Tennessee legislation was
rather badly emasculated by the court in the Collier case,21 and the Minnesota statute
was not intended to be a receivership provision, although it moves rather far in that
direction. The Minnesota Supreme Court has been very liberal in its interpretation
of the act,28 but it remains far short of the provisions of law which have been passed
in Illinois, New Jersey, and Ohio, all of which demand the special interest of this
inquiry.29
Illinois began the real history of tax receivership legislation in x933 when the
legislature passed the famous Skarda Act in an effort to meet an extremely critical
situation.30 Tax collections in Cook County were approximately two years behind,
the various municipalities were months behind in the payment of their teachers,
police, and other public servants, and local government generally was on the verge
of collapse for lack of revenue. The essential features of the legislation were as
follows:
The county treasurer was authorized to apply to any court of competent jurisdic-
tion to be appointed receiver of the rents, issues, and income of any property on
which the taxes were more than six months delinquent and remained due and
unpaid. No bond was required from the treasurer othpr than his official bond.
The bill or petition was required to set forth "(a) that such taxes remain due
and unpaid at the date of filing such bill or petition; (b) that the county collec-
tor31 has exercised due diligence to collect said taxes; and (c) that he verily believes
that such collection thereof can be made through a receivership of the rents, issues,
"Supra notes 18 and i, respectively.
'Supra note 17. In the discussion which follows, the Tennessee statute is ignored. It has not been
possible to get any specific information on the extent of application of this statute, but two recent articles,
White, Tax Delinquency in Tennessee-Legislative Aspects (1934) 12 TENN. L. REv. 7, and Howard,
Tax Delinquency in Tennessee-Administrative Aspects (936) 14 id. 219, discuss tax remedies in Tennes-
see and do not mention the receivership. It seems justifiable, therefore, to assume that it has little or no
practical importance in that state.
I See In re Taxes Delinquent (Johnson v. Richardson), 266 N. W. 867 (Minn. 1936).
'It is of some interest in passing to note that North Carolina has a statute providing that a receiver
shall be appointed to wind up the affairs of any corporation which becomes delinquent in the payment of
taxes against it or its property. The statute further provides for garnishment by the state against a
corporate agent, officer, or debtor to satisfy the obligation of the tax. N. C. CODE (Michie, 1935) §8o05.
In this connection attention should be called to statutes such as the Wisconsin statute, supra note 23,
which adopt the ordinary mortgage foreclosure procedure for foreclosure of tax liens. In Iowa the county
treasurer, in addition to all other remedies for the collection of taxes on personal properiy, may bring an
ordinary suit at law, which is equivalent to an action of debt, and it is provided that the attachment and
garnishment acts shall apply in any such proceeding. IOWA CODE (1931) c. 346, §§7186, 787. In the
attachment act it is further provided that if deemed necessary the court may appoint a receiver under the
circumstances and conditions provided in the receivership act. Id., c. 51o, §12115. In appointing a
receiver pendente lite in a civil action or proceeding the property or its rents and profits must be in danger
of loss, material injury, or impairment. Id., c. 549, §12713.
'ILL. ANN. STArT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), c. 120, §§738a, 23 8b, 238c (Ill. Laws 1933, p. 873). The con-
cept of the tax receiver was first introduced into the Illinois statutes in an amendment to the Farm
Drainage Act in 1931 (ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 42, §33a) but as far as can be determined from the appellate
court reports the statute has lain dormant. For a more detailed discussion of the Skarda Act, see Do Long,
The Illinois Tax Receivership Act (x933) 28 ILL. L. REv. 379.
$'The county treasurer in Illinois is ex oficio county collector.
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and income of such property, and the bill or petition shall be verified and shall be
prima facie evidence 'of the facts therein stated." The purpose of the receivership
was defined as "collecting and satisfying the amount of taxes, penalties, interest and
costs, and the costs and expenses of the receivership. ... ." It was further provided
that the receiver might be authorized by the court to pay out of funds collected from
the property "such expenses in connection with the maintenance and operation of
the property as may be necessary to secure the greatest income from said property
for the payment of taxes, penalties, interest and costs due thereon." The remedy was
stated to be in addition to all other remedies for the collection of taxes.
There were several other corollary provisions which provided for expedition of
the proceedings, for procedure to be followed if a complaint or objection had been
filed against the taxes involved, for appeal to the Supreme Court, for abatement of
the suit when the obligations of the property had been satisfied, and for an annual
report by the county collector upon his administration of the receiverships. Another
section provided for intervention by the county collector in any mortgage foreclosure
suit which might be pending against the delinquent property.
The New Jersey32 and Ohio33 statutes were patterned after the Skarda Act and
in many respects show its influence. Both make the remedy cumulative, require six
months delinquency, and define the purposes of the receivership in about the same
language as the Illinois act.34 New Jersey has a provision somewhat different to
cover taxes against which objections are pending. Ohio has nothing. Also, the
Ohio provision has nothing on intervention in pending mortgage foreclosures while
New Jersey has followed the Illinois section. The Illinois provisions on appeal and
annual report are unique. All three statutes are similar in providing for the pay-
ment of the expenses of the receivership except that Ohio specifically authorizes the
expenditure of the income for fire, windstorm, and public liability insurance pre-
miums. Ohio and Illinois provide merely that the proceeding shall abate when the
obligation is satisfied. New Jersey requires the collector to apply for a discharge.
The New Jersey statute differs from the Skarda Act in several particulars: It
applies to property "in any municipality." Farm property or other real estate oc-
cupied by the owner and from which he derives no rent is exempt. The bill or
petition is filed in the court of chancery, on five days notice to the owner, by the
collector or other officer charged with the collection of taxes in the municipality.
The approval of the governing body of the municipality is required. The bill or
petition is similar to that set out in Illinois but it requires a further statement whether
the property carries a first mortgage or not, and if so the name and address of the
mortgagee. It has an interesting agency provision that if there is a first mortgage the
receiver, with the consent of the governing body of the municipality, shall appoint
" N. J. Laws 1933, p. 1304.
'Omo GEN. CODE (Baldwin's Supp. 1934) S557o3, 5703-1, 5703-2.
"New Jersey uses the term "rents and income" throughout, while Illinois and Ohio use "rents, issues,
and income."
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the mortgagee to act as agent to collect rents and manage the property. In other
cases the receiver, with the approval of the governing body, shall appoint the person
in charge or some other competent person to act as agent. It is specified that the
receiver must apply to the court for removal of an agent.
In Ohio the county treasurer may file the petition in the court of common
pleas if the property is not used and occupied in good faith by the owner as a private
residence and if no agreement to pay in instalments is in effect. He is required to
allege a description of the property, the amount of taxes, the fact of delinquency, and
his belief that collection can be made. The form of the prayer is set forth in some-
what more detail in the Ohio act but the difference is not substantial. Several lots
may be joined in one action, but the prosecutor may move for severance. In any
case the decree or order shall be severally rendered. As in New Jersey and Illinois
the petition shall be verified and shall be prima facie evidence of all facts stated
therein. The tax duplicate or delinquent land tax certificate shall be prima facie
evidence of the amount and validity of the assessments and other charges.
The court in Ohio is required to enter a finding of the amount of taxes due and
unpaid, penalties, interest, costs, and charges and of the probable amount of rents,
issues, and income which can be collected together with/probable costs and expenses
of the receivership. The court order requires satisfaction and appoints the county
treasurer receiver. If it is found that the probable aggregate annual income is under
$2ooo, it is to 15e conclusively presumed that the taxes and other obligations cannot
be .satisfied and the proceeding shall be dismissed. Where the property is used by
the owner for manufacturing, mercantile, commercial, or other business purposes,
the receiver on order of court is to collect rent monthly in advance from the owner.
If any instalment is not paid when due, the court order shall have the force and
effect of a writ authorizing the receiver summarily to evict and exclude the owner
from the use of the property.
It became the practice under the Skarda Act in Cook County to file tax -receiver-
ship petitions in the county court which has a very broad jurisdiction in tax matters.
The Supreme Court, however, held that the statute did not give the county court
jurisdiction in receivership cases.35 Instead of amending the act to confer such
jurisdiction, the Skarda Act was repealed on July 8, 1935 and a much simpler pro-
vision substituted. 3 6 Section 253 of the Revenue Act of x872 is the section which
for many years has provided that taxes shall be a lien against the property taxed and
that such a lien may be foreclosed in equity after two years' forfeiture. It was
amended to imply that the tax shall also be a lien against rents and profits and that
the lien shall be enforceable after six months' delinquency by intervening petition in
any pending suit, including ordinary tax sale procedure, having jurisdiction of the
'McDonough v. Gage, 357 Ill. 466, 192 N. E. 417 (x934); People ex tel. Englewood Bond and
Mortgage Co. v. Jarecki, 357 Ill. 475, 192 N. E. 419 (1934).
"ILL. STAT. ANN. (Callaghan, 1932-1935 Supp.) C, 120, §268.
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land.8 7  The court in such petition shall have power to appoint the "County
Collector only receiver to take possession of the real estate for the purpose of col-
lecting the rents, issues and profits therefrom, and to apply the same in satisfaction
of the tax lien." As reference to the passage in the note will show, this language
is much more restricted than the provisions of the Skarda Act, except as to courts
having jurisdiction, and there is some ambiguity as in the use of the word "only" in
the preceding sentence. It has been assumed in administration that the new statute
is as broad as the Skarda Act. Whether the courts will agree remains to be seen,
for this language is capable of interpretation as restricted as that involved in the
Collier case in Tennessee.88
This summary of statutory provisions would not be complete without some men-
tion of the receivership provisions of the model Real Property Tax Collection Law
drafted and published by a committee of the National Municipal League. 9 It is
very similar to the Illinois, New Jersey, and Ohio provisions which have been dis-
cussed. It includes the New Jersey provision permitting appointment of the first
mortgagee to act as receiver's agent on the ground that his interest in preventing
subordination of his lien will insure good management. Its provisions on title and
powers of the receiver especially should be copied in other receivership statutes.Y'
It permits the receiver to resign at any time and provides for abatement of the
action when the obligation is satisfied. Upon such abatement or resignation, excess
funds remaining shall be paid into the court. While the Illinois and New Jersey acts
provide for intervention in pending mortgage foreclosures where receivers are
already in possession of the property, the model act provides for appointment of the
tax receiver anyhow and requires the other receiver to pay over rents and income
I' "Such lien may also be enforced at any time after six months from the day the tax becomes delin-
quent out of the rents and profits of the land . . . by petition in any pending suit having jurisdiction of
the land, or in any application for judgment and order of sale of lands for delinquent taxes, in which the
land is included, in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, on the direction of the County Board
of the County or on the direction of the Corporate authorities of any taxing body entitled to receive any
part of such delinquent tax. The process, practice and procedure under this act shall be the same as
provided in . .. [general practice act] except that receivers may be appointed on not less than three
days' written notice to owners of record or persons in possession. In all such petitions the court shall
have the power to appoint the County Collector only receiver to take possession of the real estate for the
purpose of collecting the rents, issues, and profits therefrom, and to apply the same in satisfaction of the
tax lien. When the taxes set forth in the petition are paid in full, the receiver shall be discharged. . .
The remaining provisions provide for refund of excess collected, provide that the amount on the collector's
books shall be prima facie evidence of amount due, and require distribution of proceeds to sharing govern-
mental agendes. ibid.
"See the text above at note 59.
"See Report of the Committee on a Model Tax Collection Law (935) 24 NAT. MuN. Rev. (Supp.)
293, 296. See the criticism of this model act in Traynor, The Model Real Property. Tax Collection Law
(z935) 24 CA. L. Rev. 98.
' "Section x5. Tide and powers of the receiver. The title of the receiver to the rents and income
from such real property shall be the same as that of an assignee thereof, and he shall have all of the powers
of such an assignee. He may pay out of the rents and income collected by him from such real property
such expenses in connection therewith as may be necessary to keep the same in tenantable condition. The
receiver may act through deputies or agents. The receiver may insure the property against loss by fire
or other casualty."
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collected. As in New Jersey, this model law exempts residence or farm property
occupied by the owner and yielding no rent.
Extensive comparative comment and analysis of this legislation is impossible
within the space of the present discussion. One impression is clear, however-that
this legislation could have been better and less hurriedly drafted. The provisions
of the model act are considerably the best in this respect. It is of interest to note,
also, that all of this legislation, including the model act, provides that the remedy
shall be permissive and not mandatory. These provisions are also unanimous in their
failure to provide specifically that taxes shall be a lien against 'the rents and income
of property taxed as well as against the property itself. This may not be an important
matter but such a provision is at least a safeguard well worth including.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TAX RECEIVERSHIP LEGISLATION
It is inevitable that constitutional objections, both state and federal, should be
raised against a procedure so drastic as that involved in tax receivership legislation.
Some of these questions deserve mention here although none can be given extensive
analysis.4 '
One state constitutional issue of rather general interest is the suggestion that tax
receivership legislation violates constitutional provisions respecting the period of
redemption from tax sale. This attack would seem to be somewhat farfetched in
view of the fact that the appointment of a receiver is not a sale, although such con-
stitutional provisions might possibly be construed to mean that a property owner is
to have at least two years in which to pay his tax and during which he cannot be
deprived of the possession of his property. While this issue needs further analysis,
it is reasonable to conclude that such an interpretation is unlikely.42
A second state constitutional issue arises from the fact that the collecting officer
is merely authorized to invoke this procedure. Is this an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power or a grant of arbitrary discretion? The Minnesota case on the
attachment of rents is the latest to deal with this problem extensively and sustains
a similar discretion in that statute.43  Choice and discretion in the use of remedies
seem to be characteristic of our tax collection statutes and this discretion is probably
not fatal.
"
1 Strictly local problems such as that of the jurisdiction of county courts in Illinois, considered in the
Gage case, supra note 35, are purposely ignored in this discussion. Similarly, there are many other ques-
tions of law which are of interest in the discussion of tax receivers: What about a receiver's liability in
tort for negligence? Is he liable in his personal capacity? In his official capacity? Or is he an officer of
a state which has not consented to be sued? See Erwin v. Davenport, 9 Heisk. (56 Tenn.) 44 (187z).
"The following Illinois cases discuss this problem as it applies in execution on judgment in an action
of debt. Even if the property taxed is the property sold, a one year redemption period is permitted in
spite of the constitutional requirement of two years in a tax sale. Smith v. People, 3 II. App. 380 (1879);
Douthett v. Kettle, 104 Ill. 356 (1882); Langlois v. People, 212 Ill. 75, 72 N. E. 28 (1904); Clark v.
Zaleski, 253 Ill. 63, 97 N. E. 272 (x912); Zicarelli v. Stuckhart, 277 Ill. 26, x5 N. E. 192 (1917).
"SIn re Taxes Delinquent, supra note 28: "Under such a law as the one here involved, there are many
reasons for the Legislature not establishing a hard and fast rule. This court necessarily must presume
that public officials will do their duty and apply this statute wherever the necessity therefor arises." It
goes on to hold very definitely that no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power is found.
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A third issue of general importance under state constitutions is this: Is it neces-
sary that the tax be a lien against rents and income of the property before the tax
receivership may be invoked? This issue is rather vital under present statutes and
no conclusive answer can be given here. To be entirely safe, tax receivership legisla-
tion should extend the lien to the income, although there is authority to the effect
that a provision for the appointment of a receiver operates to extend the lien to rents
and income even when such lien on rents and income is not specifically created. 4
Further, it has been held that a court has the power to appoint a receiver in a mort-
gage foreclosure although the trust deed or mortgage gives no lien against income. 45
General issues of due process and questions of uniformity and classification (the
latter especially where the statute is restricted to income producing property) can be
raised under both state and federal constitutions. The courts are liberal, however,
in permitting changes in tax enforcement procedures and since the receivership stops
short of depriving the owner of tide, it probably has nothing to fear from general
due process provisions.48 As to the problem of classification and uniformity, here
again constitutional obstacle seems unlikely in this legislation and this discussion will
let it suffice to cite the Minnesota Supreme Court on this issue. 7
A federal constitutional question of some importance is the impairment of the
obligation of contract. This issue might be raised if (i) it is held that the tax must
be a lien against rents and income before the receivership can be imposed, (2) the
lien on rents and income is created by the receivership act itself or at the time of
its enactment, and (3) a receivership proceeding is then initiated against property
on which a mortgage pledging rents and income has been given or an assignment
of rents has been made prior to the statute creating the lien on income. No case
has been found on the specific problem but the paramount character of the tax
obligation is generally admitted by the courts,4 8 and the states have been permitted
wide power to change tax remedies as long as the rights of the parties to the con-
tracts affected are not substantially reduced.49 As far as the rights of mortgagees
"Haas v. Chicago Building Soc., 89 Ill.-498 (1878). See also, Bagley v. I11. Trust and Savings Bank,
199 Ill. 76, 64 N. E. xo85 (19o2); Freedman's Savings and Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U. S. 494 (1888);
Grant v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 121 U. S. 105 (1887); Omaha Hotel Co. v. Kountze, 107 U. S. 378
(1882); American Bridge Co. v. Heidlebach, 94 U. S. 798 (1877).
"Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Mack, 347 Ill. 480, s8o N. E. 412 (1932); Roach v. Glos, 181 Ill.
440; Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393 (1934). See WILLIS, CoNsrtrrnoNa. LAw (1936) 694.
"Mt. St. Mary's Cemetery Assn. v. Mullins, 248 U. S. 501 (199); Dane v. Jackson, 256 U. S. 589
(1921); League v. Texas, 184 U. S. 156 (19o2).
"In re Taxes Delinquent, supra note 28, deals very fully with this problem and indicates that it offers
very little restriction in establishing collection procedures.
"Many of the cases involve contracts of bondholders who own securities of the taxing district. Ingra-
ham v. Hanson, 297 U. S. 378 (1936); Robinson v. Hanson, 75 Utah 30, 282 Pac. 782 (1929);
Hanson v. Burris, 46 P. (2d) 400 (Utah, 1935); People ex tel. Odell v. Etchison, 347 Ill. 320 (1932);
Moore v. Gas Securities CO. 278 Fed. xix (C. C. A., 1907); Wabash Eastern Ry. Co. v. Commissioners,
134 Ill. 384, 25 N. E. 78! (189o); Union Trust Co. v. Weber, 96 Ill. 346 (s88o).
"Ingraham v. Hanson, supra note 48; Hanson v. Burris, supra note 48; Hosmer v. People, 96 Ill. 58
(z88o); State ex tel. Nat. Bond and Securities Co. v. Krahmer, 505 Minn. 422, 117 N. W. 780. But see
Fisher v. Green, 142 11. 3o; Moore v. Gas Securities Co., supra note 48; Jensen v. Wilcox Lumber Co.,
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may be concerned, the tax receivership would seem to be less drastic than the tax
sale for which it is a substitute.
The statutes which have been examined also raise a large number of procedural
questions which undoubtedly could be presented as constitutional issues in any par-
ticular proceeding-matters of notice, provisions respecting prima face evidence,
and the like. These problems have not been sufficiently contemplated in drafting
receivership legislation now in force. Although they are important, this discussion
will pass over them in view of the fact that they can be remedied in practically all
cases by amendment of the statutes involved. These issues as well as most of those
mentioned in the preceding paragraphs of this section are details which do not have
much bearing on the general issue of constitutionality of the receivership principle.
It would be most'astonishing if the principle itself should be held unconstitutional
under either federal or state provisions.
ExPERrENcE UNDm TAx REcEIvERsHP LEGISLATION
The tax receivership legislation in Illinois, New Jersey, and Ohio was the result
of the breakdown of the revenue machinery during the depression. In Cook County
the depression had the able assistance of a two year delay in the assessment and col-
lection of taxes for the years following x928-a delay arising from the fact that
fraud and favoritism in the 1927 quadrennial assessment necessitated a complete
re-assessment of the property of the county. In January, x933, approximately $17x,-
ooo,ooo in taxes for the years 1928, 1929, and 193o were due and unpaid. Of this
amount about $i5,oooooo represented chronic annual forfeitures. $132,000,000, ap-
proximately, were due from large income bearing properties in trouble from the
depression. Tax buyers refused to take more than a very small part of the offerings.
Since equity foreclosure of'the lien required two forfeitures, it was a simple matter
to delay one of such forfeitures by injunction or objection for several years. The
result of this situation in Illinois was the Skarda Act and similar, though less critical,
conditions led to the Ohio and New Jersey acts.
It has been impossible to get full information on the administrative experience in
New Jersey and Ohio but the reports of Newark and Cincinnati are of interest. The
Department of Revenue and Finance in Newark has not taken physical possession
of any properties under this act, although it credits the threat of receivership for
collection of nearly $i,oooooo in tax arrears since the act went into effect. In Hamil.
ton County, Ohio, only one receivership has operated under the act-from October
23, 1934 to June 4, 1935. Taxes amounting to $7,212.97 on this property were paid
in full. A report to the county treasurer indicates that from April 4, 1934 to Novem-
ber i9, 1935 some action was taken by his office in 374 cases of delinquency involving
$I,578,374... Of this all but $2o5,6o8.58 was paid by the end of the period. Here
295 IMI. 294, 129 N. E. 133 (1920); Thurbe Art Galleries v. Rienzi Garage, 297 11. 272, 530 N. E.
747 (1921).
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as in Newark it is clear that the threat of the act and not the actual operation con-
stituted its value. The experience of Cuyahoga County has been similar. °
The experience of Cook County, Illinois, is quite different. From April 28, 1933
to November 15, 1933 approximately 11,988 petitions were filed in the county court.
In 2,904 of these the county treasurer was appointed as receiver, although on Novem-
ber 15, 1933 only 820 properties were actually being managed in receivership. From
April 28, 1933 to June 1, 1936, under both the Skarda Act and its successor, ap-
proximately 16,241 petitions have been filed in the circuit and county courts of Cook
County. No figures are available to show how many of these properties were actually
managed. Since July 8, 1935, when the present act went into effect, petitions have
been filed in the county court in 6o8 cases, involving $4,22i,63o.24 of which $x,219,-
622.o6 has been collected. Of these 6o8 cases, 125 were dismissed on full payment
without receivership; i42 at least are in complete abeyance pending disposition of
some other action in state or federal courts; 47 cases were filed but never placed on
the call because of promises to pay, pending reorganizations, or other reasons; 174
cases are on the regular call but no receiver has been appointed because the owner
is paying in instalments; in only I8 of these cases is the county treasurer acting as
receiver and managing the property.
After the county court was denied jurisdiction of tax receivership cases, all pending
actions were transferred to or refiled in the circuit court, a total of 9,379 from June
25, :934 to August x, 1935. Approximately half of these were dismissed on payment
in full. i5oo are still pending in the circuit court where average monthly payments
of $i5o to $2oo per property are being made.
At the present time 36o properties in all are being managed under the direction
of the county treasurer as receiver. These are mainly large hotel and apartment
properties, although six residences are now in such receivership. No petitions have
been filed against farm property and action is taken against vacant lots only if there
is income from billboards. Small flat buildings are not put into receivership. There
is no information available to show how much has actually been collected through
the management of the property. For the first three months' operation of the act,
April 28 to August io, 1933, the county treasurer applied only S95,o4 as net income
from property managed as contrasted with $x7,ooo,ooo paid by property owners to
escape receivership.
'That the act has stimulated tax payments can not be questioned, but how much
is due to the threat and how much to the operation can hardly be determined. In
May, x934 the state's attorney's office estimated that Sxoooooooo had been collected
through the Skarda Act and that if it should be declared unconstitutional a $4ooooooo
annual slump in tax collections might be expected. From December 8, 1932 to April
27, X933--141 days-collections on delinquent taxes for io98, 1929, and 193o were
"This information has been obtained by correspondence with the collecting officers involved. The
material in the following paragraphs concerning Cook County has been supplied by members of the staff
of the County Treasurer of Cook County.
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$i6,868,oI4.83. From April .28, 1933, when the Skarda Act became effective, to
September 15, 1933-41 days-collections of the same taxes amounted to $23,786,-
789.20.
Other figures for different comparative periods could be cited to show further
that the act has been effective. Whether or not it has been popular is another issue.
There has been much criticism of the administration of these.receiverships-whether
this is informed or not is difficult to determine. It is the practice of the receivership
division of the treasurer's office to get the approval of the equity owner before
purchases of equipment or permanent improvements are made. Further, court order
must be obtained before expenditures are made except in cases of emergency or
apartment decoration involving less than one and one-half times the monthly rental,
and even in those cases the court must ratify afterward. The receiver's agents, of
whom there are now 8i for 360 properties, must be registered real estate brokers.
Their sole compensation is six per cent of the aggregate collections.
It-is clear that in Cook County, as elsewhere, the most effective aspect of tax
receivership legislation has been the threat of its use, and in its application thus far
it has been assumed that it is merely an emergency device. However, it has been
used in Cook County in some measure as a convenient instrument by which to
acquire jurisdiction of the property while some arrangement, whether receivership
or not, is worked out for payment. This suggests that the receivership might be
developed as a permanent procedure to provide a more flexible instrument of tax
enforcement to take the place of our older tax remedies. The following statement in
the 1933 Report of the Illinois Tax Commission is an interesting suggestion for such
a development:51
"The possibility of, further developing tax receivership legislation should be considered
as a means of overcoming tax delinquency. Illinois pioneered with this device in 1933 and
it has been used as a pattern in New Jersey and Ohio. A device of this character fits
admirably the objective of foremost consideration to the state; namely, the securing of
revenue. Since the state is not interested in disturbing titular relationships forced sale
should be resorted to only in event all other devices fail. The provision of the law restrict-
ing the act to income producing properties is a feature which should be modified before
the measure can be adapted for general use. It should include the properties owned by the
resident as well as those producing pecuniary income through rental arrangements. Per-
sons living in owned homes should have an opportunity to make an application for
receivership on a voluntary basis. Under this arrangement an individual owning his own
home would not subject himself to loss of title so long as the terms of receivership were
complied with. Payments would be made monthly in essentially the same manner as a
tenant meets his lease requirements. In the event voluntary receivership were not asked
for, steps should be made to transfer the title to some one able and willing to assume the
accrued obligations."
"Pp. 331-2.
